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The International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea and Customary International Law
BEN CHIGARA*

I. INTRODUCTION

International law's significance has eclipsed the "Austinian
handicap," 1 according to which international law is not, in fact,
"law."'2 Rare is the university law school that does not teach about
the international legal system. 3 There is much evidence of

* B.A. (Hons.), University of Keele (1993); LL.M., University of Hull (1994); Ph.D.,
University of Nottingham (1998); Lecturer in Law, University of Leeds (1999-present).
1. D. J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (4th ed. 1991)
(discussing jurist John Austin's denial that international law is real law and categorization
of international laws as "laws improperly so-called"). The term "Austinian handicap"
refers to John Austin's argument that there can be no legal system without a supreme
sovereign answerable to no one else and a population owing allegiance to no other
sovereign. See id. See also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 31 (lecture i) (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Curwen Press 1954) (1832)
("[C]ustom is transmuted into positive law, when it is adopted as such by the courts of
justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of the
state."); M. W. Janis, Note & Comment, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of
"InternationalLaw," 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 410 (1984) (noting that "[t]he most famous
denial that international law is real law came from... John Austin").
2. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 6.
3. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT v (1996).
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unprecedented growth in the number of ad hoc and specialized
international tribunals 4 that try individuals suspected of violating
international law and attempt to settle disputes between States.
Increasingly, national courts appear keen to try offenses
international law regards as universal jurisdiction offenses. 5 Due
to the prominence of international law, many "domestic decisions
are tempered by the need to comply with international
obligations." 6
Now, international scrutiny sometimes visits
domestic courts that previously functioned without much
publicity. As a result, the community of those interested in the
efficacy of international law, or lack thereof, continues to grow.
Central to this growth is the perceived legitimacy of international
law norms. If reliance on and resort to international law is to be
sustained, then efficiency of international judicial institutions must
be maximized.
According to the Registrar of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (Tribunal), the Tribunal's objective is "to be a
user-friendly, cost-effective, and efficient institution."' 7 Perhaps
the foremost requirement for achieving efficiency is to create rules
in accordance with the system's recognized means of law
creation 8 -before making arguments as to their equitable and
consistent application. 9 Increases in the number of permanent
4. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 292-298 (3d ed.
1998) (noting that "to some, the answer to all the world's problems is to be found in legal
codes and international tribunals").
5. See Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), 2 W.L.R. 827 (1999 H.L.) (holding that a Head of State, here Senator
Augusto Pinochet, was not immunity from extradition for offenses of torture or conspiracy
to torture because there is no immunity under customary international law; thus, national
courts may adjudicate cases involving these offenders).
6. Diana Woodhouse, Introduction to THE PINOCHET CASE: A LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (Diana Woodhouse ed., 2000).
7. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), ITLOS/Press 16, (Oct. 20,
1998) <http://www.un.org[Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_16.htm> (quoting Registrar of
the Tribunal, Mr. Gritakumar E. Chitty) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ITLOS/Press 16].
8. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-95 (1st ed. 1961) (arguing that
only the unification of secondary rules of recognition, which establish the methods through
which the norms of legal systems are formed, and the norms of the systems, which stipulate
the rights and duties of the systems' subjects, can rid legal systems of the uncertainty
inherent in rule-making).
9. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG

NATIONS 150 (1990) (arguing that what leads most states voluntarily to comply with norms
of international law is evidence in the international legal system of coherency in both the
creation and application of rules); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International'
System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988) (discussing different principles and perspective on
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and transitory international tribunals applying custom as a source
of law make observance of this requirement a matter of prime
concern.
II.

BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
LAW OF THE SEA

A. Origin

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an
independent international judicial institution established pursuant
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCOLS). 10 The UNCOLS is one of the most comprehensive
international treaties of all time. It provides for the outer limits to
which coastal states can claim jurisdiction in adjacent waters and
regulates prominent issues such as fisheries and navigation. 11 An
entire chapter of the UNCOLS is devoted to preventing the
pollution of the marine environment. 12
The Convention
pronounces the deep seabed's resources as "the common heritage
of mankind ' 13 and sets up the International Seabed Authority to
regulate the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. 14 At
present, 132 states are party to the UNCOLS, 15 indicating
widespread approval of the Convention.
The UNCOLS gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over a variety
of international disputes between states, such as those involving
fisheries, navigation, ocean pollution, and delimitation of maritime
zones. 16 The Tribunal also has compulsory jurisdiction over the
prompt release of arrested vessels and their crews (in certain
circumstances and under certain conditions), 17 which the Tribunal
has invoked in at least two of the three disputes it has thus far

how and why states choose or chose not to comply with international laws).
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Convention on the Law of
the Sea].
11. See id. pt. II, §§ 1-2, at 1272-1273.
12. See id. pt. XII, at 1308-1315.
13. Id. pt. XI, § 2, art. 136, at 1293.
14. See id. pt. XI, § 4(A), arts. 156-158, at 1298.
15. See U.N. Press Release SEA/1675, UN-Meeting of States Partiesto Law of Sea
Convention Opens at Headquarters (May 22, 2000) <http://www.health.fgov.be/
WHI3/krant/krantarch2000/kranttekstmay/000524m06un.htm>.
16. See Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XI, § 5, art. 186, supra note 10, at 1306.
17. See id. pt. XV, § 2, art. 292, at 1323.
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considered.1 8 Additionally, the Tribunal's Seabed Disputes
Chamber 19 has its own specialized jurisdiction over disputes
20
arising out of pollution from seabed activities.
B. Sources of Law
Article 293(1) of the UNCOLS21 directs the Tribunal to apply
the Convention provisions and other rules of international law not
incompatible with the Convention. 22 Article 293(1) appears to
authorize the Tribunal to resort to customary international law as
long as it is consistent with the Convention. Certainly, the
Tribunal has applied customary international law in the cases it
has this far decided. 23
The UNCOLS, however, retains
prominence and overrides other sources falling within Article
293(1)'s purview. Pursuant to Article 293(2), Article 293(1) does
not prejudice the Tribunal's power to decide a case ex aequo et
bono,24 if the parties so agree. 25 This provision appears to
authorize the Tribunal to resort to customary international law
that is possibly inconsistent with the Convention if parties to a
dispute choose. The ability of parties to choose the method and
manner through which to resolve their disputes is one of the
Convention's most revered virtues, hence its considerable
26
success.

18. See Camouco (Pan. v. Fr.) (Int'l Trib. for the L. of the Sea, Feb. 7, 2000), available
at <http://www.un.org[Depts/los/ITLOS/5camouco.htm> (application for prompt release
and judgment); MNV "Saiga" (No. 2) (Saint Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea), 38
I.L.M. 1323 (1999) (Int'l Trib. for the L. of the Sea, July 1, 1999) (judgment), also available
at <http://www.un.org/Depts/loslJudg-E.htm> [hereinafter MN Saiga (No. 2)].
19. See Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XI, § 5, art. 186-187, supra note 10, at
1307.
20. See id. pt. XII, § 5, art. 208, supra note 10, at 1310.
21. See id. pt. XV, § 2, art. 293(1), at 1324.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Camouco, paras. 61-73; MIV Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M. at 1347-1352,
paras. 110-138.
24. The term "ex aequo et bono" means "according to what is equitable and good"
and is used "esp[ecially] in international law when a case by agreement of the principals is
to be decided on grounds of equity and reason rather than specific points of law."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 790 (1986).
25. See Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XV, § 2, art. 293(2), supra note 10, at
1324.
26. According to Article 287 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter,
a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of
the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation
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C. Relationship with InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ)
According to the Agreement on Cooperation and
Relationship Between the United Nations and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 27 which came into force on
September 8, 1998 when adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly at its 52nd Session,28 the Tribunal formally entered a
relationship with the ICJ, which is the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations. 29 The Tribunal is now part of the system for
the peaceful settlement of disputes30 laid down in the United
Nations Charter. 31 The Tribunal also has "observer status" at
General Assembly deliberations. 32 Nonetheless, even where no
formal link exists between the ICJ and other tribunals, practice
shows that tribunals 33 readily invoke and apply rules of general
international law the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent
34
Court of International Justice (PCIJ), previously inaugurated.

or application of this Convention: (a) the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; (b) the International Court of
Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a
special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or
more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XV, § 2, art. 287, at 1322-1323.
27. Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship Between the United Nations and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, adopted Sept. 8, 1998, G.A. Res. 52/521
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 92d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 39(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/521
(1998).
28. See ITLOS/Press 16, supra note 7.
29. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
30. See Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XV, § 1, art. 280, supra note 10, at 1322.
31. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
32. See ITLOS/Press 16, supra note 7. "Observer status" entitles representatives of
an organization to attend meetings when the organization, itself, is not a member of the
meeting body. "Observers usually do not vote or sign documents but may participate in
discussions." JAMES R. Fox, DICrTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
314 (1992).
33. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were established as ad hoc responses to
events in their respective territories-jurisprudence emerging from these tribunals is filled
with claims and counterclaims involving international law that other international tribunals
declared as customary. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Case No. IT-941-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 4849 (1996). See also generally The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: Summary of
the Judgement in Jean-Paul Akayesu Case, 11 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 336 (1999)
(providing a summary of Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998)).
34. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
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D. The Difficulty
Notwithstanding existence or non-existence of special
relationships with the ICJ, problems arise when, without further
scrutiny, tribunals invoke and apply rules of customary
international law previously inaugurated by other international
tribunals. Consequently, the legitimacy of custom as a source of
international law may further be aggravated. Previous judicial
practice on custom led to the view that custom is a mysterious
phenomenon amounting to "no more than a legal fiction." 35 A
former ICJ judge perceived the use of custom as "both delicate
and difficult. '36 The current work of the International Law
Association Committee on the Formation of Customary
International Law37 and long and unrelenting publicist
commentary 38 both suggest that tribunals' uncritical acceptance of

Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 933 (directing the ICJ to apply "international custom" in settling
disputes) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
35. N. C. H. Dunbar, The Myth of Customary InternationalLaw, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1, 18-19 (1983) (advocating the abandonment of the term "customary international
law" in favor of international state practice or custom, qualified by adjectives such as
general or particular).
36. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 175
(Feb. 20) (Tanaka, J., dissenting) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf].
37. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH
CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 623-646 (1996) (Customary (General)
International Law).
38. See generally ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1971) (discussing opinio juris); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1993) (arguing that leaps in technological
advances in recent years confound some of the assumptions previously held about
formation of rules of customary international law because states now apply ever changing
means to demonstrate their practice and beliefs about international law); Eduardo
Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, Customary InternationalLaw and the Conference on the Law of the
Sea, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 575
(Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984) (arguing that the package deal approach states employed to
arrive at the Convention's final text demonstrates new practice in treaty negotiation);
Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of InternationalLaw, 1974-1975 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (expounding the consensual theory of custom); H. C. M. Charlesworth, Customary
International Law and the Nicaragua Case, 11 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1984-1987)
(analyzing the value of consent in the formation of customary international law); Jonathan
I. Charney, The PersistentObjector Rule and the Development of Customary International
Law, 1985 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (examining the dissenting state's function in the formation
of customary international law); P. E. Corbett, The Consentof States and the Sources of the
Law of Nations, 1925 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20 (critiquing use of the term "source" in
discourse regarding legislation creating international law agencies); Anthony A. D'Amato,
Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1987) (arguing that
international tribunals are better at applying customary international law than at defining
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rules that other tribunals previously declared as customary law
may further weaken the legitimacy of using custom as a source of
law. This decline in customary international law's perceived
the majority of
legitimacy should not be taken lightly because
39
international law rules are customary in nature.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS' VIOLATION OF CUSTOM'S
ENABLING PROVISION (ARTICLE 38(1)(B) OF THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ STATUTE))

A. Lessons from M/V "Saiga" (No. 2)40
Practice akin to indirect violation of custom's requirements
appeared to occur when the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea decided the merits of its very first case, M/V "Saiga" (No.
2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea).41 The case arose
from the Guinea Government's arrest of the Saiga oil tanker and
its crew on October 28, 1997.42 The ship was provisionally
registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on March 12,
1997. 4 3 "The master and crew of the ship were all of Ukrainian
nationality" 44 and there were three Senegalese nationals
employed on board as painters.45 Addax BV of Geneva,
Switzerland owned the cargo of gas oil.46 "The Saiga was engaged

it); Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in InternationalLaw, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 211 (1969) (explaining the difficulty of proving state consent to the same
practice); H. Meijers, How is International Law Made?-The Stages of Growth of
International Law and the Use of Its Customary Rules, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1978)
(insisting that the formal requirements established by custom's enabling provisionArticle 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute-must be adhered to in the formation of rules of
customary international law); M. H. Mendelson, The Nicaragua Case and Customary
InternationalLaw, 26 COEXISTENCE 85 (1989) (arguing that the ICJ inaugurated a new
norm of customary international law, without regard to ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(b)'s
formal requirements) [hereinafter Mendelson, The Nicaragua Case]; Maurice Mendelson,
The Subjective Element in Customary InternationalLaw, 1995 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 177, 177
("Whilst there is relatively little disagreement that State practice is an indispensable
element, considerable controversy surrounds the nature of the subjective element."
(footnote omitted)).
39. See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (3d ed. 1996).
40. 38 I.L.M. 1323 (1999).
41. See id. at 1335, para. 31.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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in selling gas oil as bunker and occasionally water to fishing and
other vessels off the coast of West Africa." 47 The Guinea
Government alleged that by importing gas oil into the customs
radius (rayon des douanes) of Guinea, the Saiga violated Guinea's
domestic laws, 48 which control and suppress the sale of gas oil to
fishing vessels in Guinea's customs radius. 49 The Government of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines argued that the arrest of the
Saiga and the subsequent actions of the Guinea Government were
illegal under international law and that the Saiga had not violated
Guinea's domestic laws because it had not imported oil into
50
Guinea.
Determination of whether Guinea's arrest of the Saiga
conformed with its obligations to Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines under international law required the Tribunal to
navigate and reconcile the difference between domestic
jurisdiction and international jurisdiction. First, the Tribunal
invoked the PCIJ decision 51 in Concerning Certain German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia52 and second, it invoked Article 58
of the Geneva Convention. 53 These references indicated that the
Tribunal was competent to determine whether the laws the
Guinea Government relied on to impute wrongdoing to the Saiga
were consistent with Guinea's responsibility to other states under
international law. In Polish Upper Silesia, the PCIJ ruled that
customary law recognized an international tribunal's competence
to "examine the applicability and scope of national law." 54 This
formed the basis of the Tribunal's determination that it was
competent to consider the validity of Guinea's domestic law. The
Tribunal also adduced Article 58 of the Geneva Convention as
further evidence of its competence. 55
47.

Id.

48. See id. at 1347, para. 111.
49. See id. at 1349, para. 116.
50. See id. at 1347, para. 110; 1349, para. 117.
51. See id. at 1349, para. 120.
52. See Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25) [hereinafter Polish Upper Silesia].
53. Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 58, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 66, T.I.A.S. No. 3362
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I].
54. Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. at 19 (ruling that the Court may review the
question of whether or not, in applying Poland's domestic law, Poland is acting in
conformity with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention).
55.

See M/V Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1349-1350, paras. 120-121, para. 131
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Two points must be made regarding the Tribunal's approach.
Firstly, applying the PCIJ's customary law declarations to legal
questions under the Tribunal's consideration facilitates
adjudication only to the extent that the rule of customary law
invoked and applied was formed in compliance with Article
38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, 56 which is also known as the source of
custom or as custom's enabling provision. Difficulties arise when
a tribunal applies customary international law inaugurated by
another tribunal in circumstances that do not meet the
Two cases illustrate this
requirements in Article 38(1)(b).
difficulty: Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania),57 which
was the first case to come before the ICJ, and Military and
ParamilitaryActivities (Nicaragua v. United States).58 Both cases
demonstrate the danger of applying, without further scrutiny,
rules other tribunals have inaugurated as "customary"
international law.
B. Lessons from Corfu Channel
On October 22, 1946, two British cruisers and two destroyers
entered the North Corfu Strait.59 The channel they were
following, which lay in Albanian waters, was considered safe,
having been swept for mines in 1944, and again in 1945.60
Nonetheless, one of the destroyers struck a mine and was gravely
damaged. 61 The other destroyer was sent to assist, and while
towing the damaged destroyer, also struck a mine, and was
seriously damaged. 62 Forty-four British officers and sailors lost
their lives, and forty-two others were wounded. 63 On May 15,
1946, prior to the Corfu Channel incidents, an Albanian warship
fired in the direction of the two British cruisers. 64 The British

(1999). This is consistent with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Convention on
the Law of the Sea annex VI, arts. 1(4), 20, 21, supra note 10, at 1345, 1348.
56. ICJ Statute art. 38, supra note 34, at 1060.
57. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (merits) [hereinafter Corfu
Channel].
58. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(merits) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
59. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 12.
60. See id. at 13-14.
61. See id. at 12 (the British destroyer, the H.M.S. Saumarez).
62. See id. at 13 (the British destroyer, the H.M.S. Volage).
63. See id. at 10.
64. See id. at 27.
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Government protested arguing that innocent passage through
straits was a right recognized by international law-the Albanian
Government replied that foreign warships and merchant vessels
had no right to pass through Albanian territorial waters without
prior authorization. 65 To this, the British Government responded
that if, in the future, the Albanian Government opened fire on a
British warship passing through the channel, the British ship
66
would return the fire.
In its response to the first of the parties' inquiries, the ICJ
rejected the British Government's argument that the case's
operative cause 67 originated in the Hague Convention VIII of
1907,68 which obligates coastal states to inform other states of the
danger to which they might expose themselves if they come within
69
territorial waters they have reason to believe are unsafe.
According to the ICJ, the Hague Convention VIII's application is
limited to war situations, and the setting in which the October 22
explosion occurred could hardly be described as a war situation,
even though there was tension between the two parties. 70 Instead
the ICJ reasoned that, the action resulted from what it called:
general and well recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime
communication; and every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights
71
of other States.
Albania imposed upon itself the duty to warn the maritime
community in general, and the approaching British vessels in
particular, because Albania knew vessels sailing through its
72
territorial waters would be exposed to the dangers of the mines.
This duty originated from the customary "elementary

65. See id.
66. See id.
67. "Operative clause," as used herein, means the legal basis of a case.
68. Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2322, T.S. No. 541 [hereinafter Hague Convention VIII].
69. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 10 (referring to Hague Convention VIII art. 3,
supra note 68).
70. See id. at 84.
71. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits),Judgment of 9 April 1949, 1948-1949 I.C.J. Y.B.
57, 61 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Corfu Channel Case (Merits)].
72. See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 87.
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considerations of humanity." 73 Although the ICJ generously
described this obligation as a "general and well-recognized"
principle 74 of customary law, neither the United Kingdom
Government nor the Albanian Government had previous
75
knowledge thereof.
Because it invoked the 1907 Convention as the basis of its
claim, the U.K. Government had to establish that Albania was
bound by the Convention-this suggests that until the ICJ's
declaration in Corfu Channel, the principle of "elementary
considerations of humanity" was not as recognized and accepted
as the ICJ implied. This suggestion contrasts sharply with the
ICJ's boldness in describing the principle as both general and wellrecognized. 76 This tendency of international tribunals to ordain
hitherto-unknown customary international law norms as "general
and recognized" is a great source of concern.
According to author Maurice Mendelson, the ICJ makes
"bold statements about what it considers to be self-evident or
axiomatic principles of customary international law, without
troubling very much, if at all, to identify the evidence in support of a
proposition."77 This system illustrates international tribunals'
practice of imposing rules of custom on international law simply
because they chose to exercise their discretion, rather than
because states have demonstrated sufficient state practice and
opinio juris on the matter.
This practice directly violates ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(b),
which seems to limit international tribunals' liberty to inaugurate
new norms of customary law to situations evidencing general and
consistent state practice over a considerable time wherein the
practicing states act under the belief that their conduct is

73. Id. at 22.
74. Id.
75. This argument is one that the ICJ itself would later deploy to deny Columbia's
claim in Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). Of course the distinction
between these two cases is that the former refers to general, while the latter refers to
particular customary international law, if this significance is important at all. Compare
Olufemi Elias, The Relationship Between General and ParticularCustomary International
Law, 8 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67 (1996) (proposing that this distinction matters in the
emergence of norms of customary international law) with BEN CHIGARA, LEGITIMACY
DEFICIT IN CUSTOM: TOWARDS A DECONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY ch. 4 (forthcoming Jan.
2001) (proposing that it might not).
76. See Corfu Channel Case (Merits), supra note 71, at 61.
77. Mendelson, The Nicaragua Case, supra note 38, at 85 (emphasis added).
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obligatory. 78 This process results in the mystification of the origin
of law because it results in norms of customary international law
manifesting both rules created in accordance with Article 38(1)(b)
and those that international tribunals imposed on states without
regard to Article 38(1)(b).
Perhaps when it inaugurated the customary law norm of
"elementary considerations of humanity" the ICJ should have
simultaneously confirmed consummation of states' practice and
their sense of obligation on the matter. Only such a confirmation
entitles an international tribunal to declare the emergence of a
new customary international law norm. The question of whether
manifestation of such state practice and opinio juris could have
bypassed United Kingdom involvement, or at the very least, its
attention, presents a real dilemma for the ICJ.
In North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark,
Germany v. Netherlands),79 the ICJ later emphasized that the
practice of specially affected states is central to the formation of
customary law. 80 The United Kingdom is certainly a "specially
affected" state regarding maritime activities. The probability that
the requisite practice and obligation beliefs required to establish
this new norm of customary law eluded the United Kingdom
entirely is remote. Further, there is no reason why the U.K.
Government would mount its case on a remotely applicable
convention when it could have relied on a general and wellrecognized principle of customary law. This illustrates the
unlikelihood of consummation of the state practice and opinio
juris required to justify such a declaration.
Casting doubt on the validity of the declaration's justification
is the fact that the explosion in Corfu Channel occurred not long
after the Second World War. At that time, having emerged from
the War as one of the five super powers that took the initiative to
rethink the new international order, British influence on
international life was perhaps at its peak. As one of the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,81 the
U.K. Government would have known if the Security Council had
passed a resolution promoting the idea of common humanity in

78. See ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b), supra note 34, at 1060.
79. 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
80. See id. at 127-128.
81.

U.N. CHARTER art. 23.

20001

InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea

maritime matters. There is little support for the proposition that
perhaps bilateral and multilateral treaties had incorporated this
principle into international practice. In fact, there is a stark
contrast between the ICJ's declaration of this self-evident
principle and its reticence to justify its opinions with actual
evidence.
Furthermore, discrediting the notion that this was a generally
recognized and accepted idea is the presence of domestic pressure
on the U.K. Government to address the Corfu Channel
incident 82 - it would not have missed the opportunity to invoke
such a self-evident rule had it existed. Although the point shall
not be belabored, the ICJ's inauguration of "elementary
considerations of humanity" as a principle of customary
international law carried with it a duty to justify its action.
Nevertheless, the ICJ appeared content to declare the principle
"customary law," without even attempting to demonstrate that the
declaration was the result of the process of custom-and not of
the ICJ's imagination. Had the ICJ been mindful to justify its
action, it would have also had to specify (1) when the creative
process started and finished, (2) what elements signified state
practice and opinio juris in that process, (3) whether it was a
smooth or difficult process, long or short, and more importantly,
83
(4) that sufficient state practice and opinio juris were manifest.
Such specifications would have84clarified what constitutes sufficient
state practice and opinio juris.

C. Lessons from Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, the ICJ considered the interaction between
treaty norms and custom. 85 The principles enshrined in Articles
2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter were at issue. 86 The
United States' reservation as to the applicability of multilateral
treaties when accepting the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article 36(2)
of the ICJ Statute precluded application of Charter provisions in

82. See 427 PAR. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1667-1669 (1946).
83. See ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b), supra note 34, at 1060.
84. See Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT
A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 717,718 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989).

85. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27). See also North Sea Continental Shelf,
1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20).
86. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 22, 35.
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cases to which it was a party. 87 Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan
Government argued that principles similar to those in the U.N.
Charter also existed under customary international law 88 and
therefore, notwithstanding the United States' reservation, those
principles were applicable to both parties. 89 The manner in which
the ICJ determined this aspect of the dispute has attracted much
attention. 90 According to the ICJ, "the Charter gave expression in
this field to principles already present in customary international
law and that law has in the subsequent four decades developed
under the influence of the Charter to such an extent that a number
of rules have acquired a status independent of it." 91
The ICJ gave no explanation as to why state practice relative
to the use of force since 1945 reflected "customary law" and not
the states' compliance with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which
prohibits the use of force against a sovereign state. 92 ICJ Judge
Jennings lamented that, having failed to apply the U.N. Charter as
such, the Court applied portions of the Charter anyway by
positing that such provisions have become customary law
93
independent of the Charter.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions 94 were also relevant to the
Nicaragua proceedings. The United States' reservation on the
application of multilateral treaties precluded the Conventions'
direct application qua treaty.95 This situation once more presented

87. See id. at 34-35.
88. See id. at 35.
89. See id.
90. See Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 11. See generally John Lawrence Hargrove,
Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM .J. INT'L L.
135, 143 (1987) ("[I]t is not the business of the courts to send messages or stand up to
litigants .... The business of courts is to apply the law and preserve the integrity of the
legal order, without regard to any perceptions of relative power or moral purity of the
parties. Just doing that well will be message enough."). See also Mendelson, The
Nicaragua Case, supra note 38, at 85.
91. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 96-97.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
93. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 532 (Jennings, J., dissenting).
94. Geneva Convention (I), supra note 53; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II];
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
95. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 113.
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the ICJ with an opportunity to discuss how customary
international law develops alongside conventional law. 9 6 The ICJ
observed that the Geneva Conventions represented "in some
respects a development, and in other respects no more than the
expression of fundamental principles of general international
law." 97 The Court cited the following denunciation language,
common to all four Geneva Conventions,98 as an example of a
proclamation of pre-existing customary international law:
shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the
conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience. 99
This means that a state that withdraws from one of the Geneva
Conventions "would nevertheless remain bound by the principles
contained in it insofar as they are an expression customary
100
international law."
The ICJ cited Articles 1 and 3, common to all four Geneva
Conventions as indicative of the Conventions' transformation into
customary international law. 10 1 Article 1, perhaps one of the
shortest provisions of the Conventions, 10 2 states that "the High
Contracting parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all its circumstances. ' 10 3 The ICJ held
that this meant that:

96. Identical treaty and customary rules can in fact exist side by side. The Court has
stated that, "[E]ven if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear
identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the
level of treaty-law and on that of customary law, those norms retain a separate existence."
Id. at 95. The Court also suggested that these same identical rules may have different
legal consequences qua treaty rules and qua customary rules. See id.
97. Id. at 113.
98. See id. at 113-114 ("[T]he Geneva Conventions are in some respects a
development, and in other respects no more than the expression, of such [fundamental
general principles of humanitarian law]" (citing Geneva Convention I art. 63, supra note
53; Geneva Convention II art. 62, supra note 94; Geneva Convention III art. 142, supra
note 94; Geneva Convention IV art. 158, supra note 94)).
99. Geneva Convention I art. 63, supra note 53, at 68.
100. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary International Law, 81
AM. J.INT'L L. 348, 352 n.13 (citation omitted) (1987).
101. See id. at 352.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I art. 1, supra note 53, at 32.
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there is an obligation on the United States Government, in
terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 'respect' the
Conventions and even 'to ensure respect' for them 'in all
circumstances,' since such an obligation does not derive only
from the Conventions themselves, but from the general
principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely
give specific expression. The United States is thus under an
obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the
conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of
Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions .... 104
The Court here implied that both Article 1 and Article 3 were
reflective of pre-existing customary international law.10 5 This
conclusion is problematic because "there is no evidence,.., that at
that time the negotiating [s]tates believed that they were codifying
an existing principle of law."' 1 6 States appear to have chosen the
words "'to ensure respect' deliberately 'to emphasize and
strengthen the responsibility of the [c]ontracting[p]arties,'' 10 7 not
to restate pre-existing customary international law or bring about
the evolution thereof.
It is also apparent that the language "to ensure respect"
appears for the first time in these Conventions-as "it was not
used in earlier Geneva Conventions. 10 8 "[R]epetition of such
prior usage would have strengthened the claim that the phrase is
10 9
declaratory of international law."
D. PotentialViolation of Custom in M/V Saiga
Nicaragua illustrates that international tribunals can tailor
outcomes by inaugurating norms of customary international law
without regard to the requirements of ICJ Statute Article
38(1)(b). Further application of the rules established through this
belligerence by other international tribunals repeats the initial
belligerence on Article 38(1)(b). This can only harm custom's
perceived legitimacy as a source of law.
Thus, when the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea applied, without
further scrutiny, general international law from the PCIJ's

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27).
See Meron, supra note 100, at 352.
See id. at 353.
Id. at 353 & nn.15-16.
Id. at 353.
Id.
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decision in Polish Upper Silesia,110 it created the potential for
perpetuating belligerence toward custom. The Tribunal justified
itself by demonstrating that in addition to Polish Upper Silesia,
Article 58 of the UNLOSC also provided for application of the
same principle111 in that:
[T]he rights and obligations of coastal and other States under
the Convention arise not just from the provisions of the
Convention but also from national laws and regulations
'adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention.' Thus, the Tribunal is competent to
of such laws and regulations with
determine the compatibility
112
the Convention.
Having established that the Saiga was operating outside Guinea's
territorial sea area when arrested, the Tribunal considered
whether the Guinea Government's otherwise wrongful application
of its customs laws to the exclusive economic zone was justifiable
under general international law. 113 The Guinea Government
could be justified under the doctrine of
pleaded that its actions
"state necessity." 114
The Tribunal referred to general
115
international law in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.
Slovakia),116 wherein the ICJ established that two conditions must
be satisfied before the state of necessity defense can be invoked to
justify an otherwise wrongful act, namely, that "(a) the act was the
only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the [s]tate
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) the act did not
interest of the [s]tate towards which
seriously impair an essential
117
existed.
obligation
the

110. See Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25).
111. See MNV Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1349-1350, paras. 120-121 (1999).
112. Id. at 1350, para. 121.
113. See id. at 1351, para. 132.
114. See id. at 1351-1352, para. 133.
115. See id. at 1351-1352, paras. 132-133.
116. See Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 4 (Sept. 25).
117. MIV Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M. at 1351-1352, para. 133 (quoting GabcfkovoNagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 36-37 (quoting International Law Commission, Draft
Articles on the International Responsibility of States art. 33, para. 1, in Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session 6 May-26 July 1996,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 10, ch. III, U.N. Doc. A/510/10 (1996), availableat (visited
Aug. 20, 2000) <http://www.un.org/lawlilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm> [hereinafter ILC
Draft Articles])).
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The Tribunal relied on the ICJ's view that these conditions
must be satisfied and that this view reflected customary
international law. 1 18 The Guinea Government's appeal to the
state necessity defense could not be sustained 119 because, as the
Tribunal explained:
however essential Guinea's interest in maximizing its tax
revenue from the sale of gas oil to fishing vessels, it cannot be
suggested that the only means of safeguarding that interest was
to extend
its customs laws to parts of the exclusive economic
12 0
zone.
Thus, customary international law formed the Tribunal's raison
1 21 in its determination
d'itre
of the legal question of whether the
Guinea Government's wrongful application of its customs laws to
the exclusive economic zone was justifiable under general
122
international law.
The ICJ appeared to premise its declaration that the requisite
conditions to be fulfilled before for a state may use the state
necessity defense were general international law under Article 33,
paragraph 1 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft
Articles on the International Responsibility of States. 123 The
ILC's function is to facilitate international law's progressive
development through codification of customary international
law. 124
Among the projects currently before the ILC are
international state responsibility, international liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by
international law, and crimes against the peace and security of
mankind. 125 Therefore, the ILC's work is a good place to look for
evidence of customary international law. Not all of the ILC's
work, however, involves customary international law. Therefore,
when tribunals point to the ILC's work as evidence of general

118.
119.
120.

See MIV Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M. at 1352, para. 134.
See id. at 1352, para. 136.
See id. at 1352, para. 135.

121. The term

"raison d'etre" means "reason

or justification for existence."

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 1877.
122. See M/V Saiga (No. 2), 38 I.L.M at 1351, para. 132.
123. ILC Draft Articles art. 33, para. 1, supra note 117.
124. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 66.

125.

See id. at 67.
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international law's existence, care still must be taken to ensure
that Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute1 26 is not circumvented.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is a muchwelcome development.
It confirms the United Nations'
commitment to establishing a universal regime governing the seas
and oceans. The Tribunal breathes life into efforts to apply the
regime of the seas to the UNLOSC, which came into force in 1994.
According to the Tribunal Registrar, the Tribunal's objective is to
become
a
"user-friendly,
cost-effective,
and
efficient
128
institution," 127 and one that observes custom's requirements.
Article 293 of the UNLOSC authorizes the Tribunal to apply
customary international law. 129 Emerging case law illustrates the
Tribunal is ready to apply customary international law, 130 which
has been described as a mysterious phenomenon amounting to no
more than a "legal fiction" 131 and as being "both delicate and
difficult. ' 132 Inaugurating rules of customary international law
without due regard to the Article 38(1)(b) requirements is a direct
violation of the doctrine of custom that severely undermines its
legitimacy. 133 Indirect violation of custom occurs when an
international tribunal invokes and applies customary international
law, as previously declared by another tribunal, without
scrutinizing the basis of such a declaration. It is the latter violation
that threatens to perpetuate the cycle of belligerence toward
custom. If it becomes part of the Tribunal's practice, indirect
violation will negatively impact the Tribunal objective of achieving
efficiency. Efficiency in adjudication not only requires that rules
be applied equitably and consistently, 134 but also that rules be
established in accordance with previously recognized methods of

126. See ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b), supra note 34, at 1060.
127. ITLOS/Press 16, supra note 7.
128. See id.
129. See supra Part II.B (discussing Article 293).
130. The Tribunal has indicated its readiness to apply customary laws in such cases as
Corfu Channel, MIV Saiga, and Nicaragua. See supra Part III (discussing these cases).
131. Dunbar, supra note 35, at 18.
132. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3,175 (Feb. 20) (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
133. See generally CHIGARA, supra note 76, ch. 8 (noting that, as the midwife of
customary international law, international tribunals ought not to exercise power not
conferred by the enabling authority).
134. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reiterating a similar argument).
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construction. It might be helpful for the Tribunal, before invoking
and applying a rule of customary international law to a dispute
under its consideration, to first assure itself that another
international tribunal's inauguration of the rule was, in fact,
consistent with custom's requirements.

